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I. INTRODUCTION 
One key element of the interactions between the U.S. Congress and the 
federal courts is the relationship between the federal judiciary and the 
primary committees in Congress.  Both the House Judiciary Committee and 
the Senate Judiciary Committee have jurisdiction over most issues affecting 
the judicial branch.  There is very little academic literature that directly 
compares the U.S. House and Senate Judiciary Committees.  It can be even 
harder to find literature that compares the committees’ respective 
relationships and their interactions with the federal courts.  This article will 
attempt to fill this void.  This article will bring a new institutionalist approach 
to the analysis of the interactions between Congress and the federal courts,1 
 
*  Miller is a professor of political science, former chair of the Department of Political 
Science, and the director of the university’s Law & Society program at Clark University in 
Worcester, Massachusetts.  B.A. Ohio Northern University, J.D. George Washington 
University, Ph.D. The Ohio State University.  He served as the Judicial Fellow at the Supreme 
Court of the United States from 1999-2000, and he was a Congressional Fellow in 1995.  
During 2006-07, he was a Visiting Scholar at the Centennial Center for Public Policy of the 
American Political Science Association.  During the spring of 2008, he was the Thomas 
Jefferson Distinguished Chair, a Fulbright scholar to the American Studies Program and the 
History Department at Leiden University in the Netherlands.  For the academic year 2014-15, 
he held the Distinguished Fulbright Bicentennial Chair in North American Studies at the 
University of Helsinki in Finland.  Financial assistance for this project came in part from the 
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focusing on the respective relationships between the federal courts and each 
of the two Judiciary Committees in Congress.  This research is supplemented 
by personal interviews that I have conducted over the years with Members 
of Congress, congressional staff, federal judges, lobbyists, and those 
working in think tanks and other organizations that focus on the work of the 
judiciary and its relationship to Congress.2 
Many judicial and congressional scholars conclude that Congress and 
the federal courts are two political institutions that should not be studied in 
isolation.3  As Kevin den Dulk and Mitchell Pickerill have argued, “treating 
the Court or Congress in isolation misconstrues the nature of inter-
institutional lawmaking in the United States.  The actions of each institution 
have important reciprocal effects; both contribute to the form and substance 
 
Patron-Cohen Endowed Faculty Research Fund at Clark University.  Special thanks to 
Michael Spanos for his help in preparing this manuscript.1  New institutionalism means that 
scholars explore how “institutional cultures, structures, rules, and norms constrain the choices 
and action of individuals when they serve in a political institution.  New institutionalism thus 
combines the interests of traditionalist scholars in studying formal institutional rules and 
structures with the focus of behavioralist scholars on examining the action of individual 
political actors.”  MARK C. MILLER, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 185 (2015). 
[HEREINAFTER MILLER, JUDICIAL POLITICS].  For example, Gibson has summarized the study 
of judicial behavior using the new institutionalist model in this way, “In a nutshell, judges’ 
decisions are a function of what they prefer to do, tempered by what they think they ought to 
do, but constrained by what they perceive is feasible to do.”  James L. Gibson, From Simplicity 
to Complexity: The Development of Theory in the Study of Judicial Behavior, 5 AMER. POL. 
BEHAVIOR 7, 9 (1983). 
 2   For all of my interviews, I promised the participants that I would not reveal their 
names nor the identities of their employers.  I first interviewed Members of Congress and 
staff who served on the House Judiciary Committee (among other committees) in 1989.  An 
analysis of those interviews including quotations from the interviews can be found in MARK 
C. MILLER, THE HIGH PRIESTS OF AMERICAN POLITICS: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS IN AMERICAN 
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS (1995). [HEREINAFTER MILLER, HIGH PRIESTS].  I conducted other 
interviews during the 2006-2007 academic year, and the analysis of those interviews and 
quotations can be found in MARK C. MILLER, THE VIEW OF THE COURTS FROM THE HILL (2009). 
[HEREINAFTER MILLER, VIEW OF THE COURTS]. For this current project, I conducted additional 
interviews during the summers of 2017 and 2018.  Financial assistance for conducting these 
latest interviews came in part from the Patron-Cohen Endowed Faculty Research Fund at 
Clark University.   
Over the years, it has become much more difficult to interview current congressional staff, 
especially in the House of Representatives.  After a request for an interview with a House 
staffer, I received the following email in July of 2018, which has become a typical response 
for interview requests.  “Unfortunately, our office has a blanket policy of not participating in 
any types of research or surveys, including ones that aren’t for attribution or where data is not 
disaggregated.”  
 3   See, e.g., ROBERT A. KATZMANN, ED., JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARDS 
INSTITUTIONAL COMITY (1988); CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS AND CONGRESS 
COLLIDE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF AMERICA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM (2006); J. MITCHELL 
PICKERILL, CONSTITUTIONAL DELIBERATION IN CONGRESS: THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
IN A SEPARATED SYSTEM (2004); 
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of law.”4  These interactions are a normal part of the American system of 
separation of powers.  As Thomas Clark reminds us, “[s]eparation of powers 
represents perhaps the most important contribution the American experiment 
has made to constitutional democracy throughout the world.”5 
While there is a great deal of academic literature that analyzes the 
workings of the U.S. Congress or the federal judiciary independently, there 
is far less literature that examines the interactions between these two federal 
governmental institutions.6  Unfortunately, this relationship is not well 
understood by scholars, practitioners, or members serving in the two 
governmental institutions.7  Our lack of understanding of the interactions 
between these two branches can have serious public policy ramifications 
because each institution plays a significant role in the legislative and 
policymaking process.  As Pickerill explains, “Lawmaking in our separated 
system is continuous, iterative, speculative, sequential, and declarative . . . 
and consequently each institution in our system must necessarily anticipate, 
interact with, and react to the actions of the other institutions.”8  Thus, in 
general, the relationship between Congress and the federal courts is generally 
ill-defined, amorphous, and perhaps situationally dependent.9 
Not only do we need a better understanding of the relationship between 
Congress and the courts, but also these two branches do not understand each 
other very well.  As Robert Katzmann has argued, “Th[e] study of judicial-
congressional relations is rooted in the premise that the two branches lack 
appreciation of each other’s processes and problems, with unfortunate 
consequences for both and for policymaking more generally.”10  In 2018, I 
interviewed an employee of a think tank who also recognized this problem, 
 
 4   Kevin R. den Dulk & J. Mitchell Pickerill, Bridging the Lawmaking Process: 
Organized Interests, Court-Congress Interactions, and Church-State Relations, 35 POLITY 
419, 420 (2003). 
 5   TOM S. CLARK, THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 1 (2011).   
 6   Some example of works that examine the interactions between Congress and the 
federal courts include STEPHEN M. ENGEL, AMERICAN POLITICIANS CONFRONT THE COURT: 
OPPOSITION POLITICS AND CHANGING RESPONSES TO JUDICIAL POWER (2011); ROSS K. BAKER, 
STRANGERS ON A HILL: CONGRESS AND THE COURT (2007); GEYH, supra note 3; PICKERILL, 
supra note 3; JEB BARNES, OVERRULED?: LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDES, PLURALISM, AND 
CONTEMPORARY COURT-CONGRESS RELATIONS (2004); GEORGE I. LOVELL, LEGISLATIVE 
DEFERRALS: STATUTORY AMBIGUITY, JUDICIAL POWER, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2003); 
COLTON C. CAMPBELL AND JOHN F. STACK, JR., EDS., CONGRESS CONFRONTS THE COURT: THE 
STRUGGLE FOR LEGITIMACY AND AUTHORITY IN LAWMAKING (2001); KATZMANN, supra note 
3; ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS & CONGRESS (1997). 
 7   MICHAEL A. BAILEY, FORREST MALTZMAN, & CHARLES R. SHIPAN, THE AMORPHOUS 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE COURTS, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE 
AMERICAN CONGRESS 834 (ERIC SCHICKLER & FRANCES E. LEE, EDS. 2011). 
 8   Pickerill, supra note 3, at 4.   
 9   See generally MILLER, VIEW OF THE COURTS, supra note 2. 
 10   KATZMANN, supra note 3, at 1. 
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stating, “There is an inherent institutional distance between judges and 
legislators.  There is a lack of understanding between the branches.  Most 
Members of Congress only have a vague idea of what the federal courts 
actually do.”11  Given this lack of understanding between the branches, it is 
not surprising that our understanding of the relationship between the two 
institutions is often fuzzy.  The constitutional relationship between the two 
branches is equally nebulous.  As Michael Bailey, Forrest Maltzman, and 
Charles Shipan conclude, “Whereas Congress’s relationship with the 
executive is spelled out in detail in the Constitution, the relationship between 
Congress and the judiciary was left by the founders to be defined by history.  
Since history is rarely tidy or consistent, the relationship that exists between 
the courts and Congress is as messy as the Constitution itself.”12  This 
messiness is also reflected in the different ways that the two Judiciary 
Committees interact with the federal judiciary. 
II. THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEES AS REFLECTING THE CULTURES OF THEIR 
RESPECTIVE CHAMBERS 
In many ways, the House and Senate Judiciary Committees reflect the 
institutional cultures of their respective broader chambers.  As Woodrow 
Wilson in 1885 famously observed, “Congress in session is Congress on 
public exhibition, whilst Congress in its committee-rooms is Congress at 
work.”13  Generally, the House is designed to meet the needs of the majority 
party in the chamber, while the Senate is much more protective of the rights 
of individual Senators.14  House members, with their short two-year terms 
and generally smaller, often more homogeneous constituencies, are normally 
closer to the views of the voters in part because House members are 
constantly running for reelection.15  The House is also a highly hierarchical 
institution where power alternates over time between party leaders and 
committee chairs.16  Ambitious U.S. Representatives must find ways to 
position themselves to gain these leadership positions if power in the 
chamber is one of their goals.17  Congressmen and Congresswomen serve on 
a relatively small number of committees, and House members tend to 
specialize through their committee posts in order to be noticed in their very 
 
 11   See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 12   BAILEY, MALTZAN, & SHIPAN, supra note 7, at 835. 
 13   WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT (1885).   
 14   David W Rohde, Committees and Policy Formulation, in THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH 
219 (Paul J. Quick & Sarah A. Binder eds., 2005). 
 15   Id. 
 16   See, e.g., John H. Aldrich & David W. Rohde, Lending and Reclaiming Power: 
Majority Leadership in the House Since the 1950’s, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED (Lawrence 
C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds., 11TH ED. 2017).   
 17   RICHARD F. FENNO, CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES (1973). 
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large and crowded chamber.18 
Senators, on the other hand, have the luxury of six-year terms and have 
larger, usually more heterogeneous, constituencies within their states which 
often force them to be generalists who take a broader public policy view on 
many issues.19  In addition, the Senate has the same number of committees 
as the House with far fewer members to fill those committee slots.20  While 
House members concentrate on a small number of committees, Senators are 
often spread very thin among a large number of committee and 
subcommittee assignments.21  On the other hand, the smaller size of the 
chamber also benefits Senators because almost every Senator in the majority 
party is a committee or subcommittee chair.22  Senators often rely on staff 
for assistance in making committee decisions more than House members 
do.23 
Floor rules in the Senate make it easier for individual Senators to bypass 
the committees and offer their policy preferences as amendments on the 
floor, even if those amendments are not germane to the underlying substance 
of the legislation.24  The House, on the other hand, has a strict germaneness 
rule that requires all committee and floor amendments to legislation to be of 
a similar subject matter to the underlying bill.25  The Senate also does not 
have the equivalent of the House Rules Committee, which must approve all 
legislation coming to the floor.  The House Rules Committee sets the terms 
of floor debate for all bills and regulates the number and source of 
amendments that members can offer on the floor.26  The Senate floor is much 
more freewheeling than the House.  For example, the Senate has a filibuster 
rule, which requires sixty votes to invoke cloture and thus end debate on any 
measure subject to the filibuster.27  As Bryan Marshall and Bruce Wolpe 
note, “[t]he Senate’s small size, procedural prerogatives, and growing 
individualism have meant that the chamber’s committees have had less 
power and have been less critical for achieving members’ goals than their 
House counterparts.”28  In large part because of the ability of Senators to 
 
 18   Rohde, supra note 14, at 209–10. 
 19   ROSS K. BAKER, HOUSE & SENATE 9-11 (4TH ED. 2008). 
 20   Id. at 39.   
 21   Barbara Sinclair, The New World of U.S. Senators, CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 5 
(Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 11th ed., 2017). 
 22   Id. 
 23   Id. 
 24   Id. at 9.   
 25   WALTER J. OLESZEK, MARK J. OLESZEK, ELIZABETH E. RYBICKI & WILLIAM A. HENIFF, 
CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 211-215 (10th ed. 2015). 
 26   Rohde, supra note 14, at 219.   
 27   SARAH A. BINDER, STALEMATE: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF LEGISLATIVE 
GRIDLOCK (2003). 
 28   BRYAN W. MARSHALL AND BRUCE C. WOLPE, THE COMMITTEE, 43 (2018). 
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bypass committees and offer their amendments directly on the floor, most 
Senate committees are much weaker than the committees in the House, as is 
the committee system as a whole.29 
In general, committees in Congress serve various functions for the 
parent chamber.  From a broader institutional perspective, congressional 
committees fulfill at least three different functions: drafting legislation, 
reporting legislation to their respective full chambers, and having oversight 
and investigatory powers.30  Senate committees, of course, have the 
additional power of reviewing presidential nominations within their 
respective jurisdictions.31  Congressional committees can differ greatly in 
their jurisdictions, political environments, decision-making styles, and 
institutional cultures.32  Given the importance of committees in both 
chambers of Congress, but especially in the U.S. House of Representatives, 
both chambers have made a series of institutional and structural changes to 
the committee system over the years.33 
Committee membership helps members fulfill various professional and 
policy goals.34 Richard Fenno argued that the institution of the congressional 
committee system was designed in part to meet the individual goals of 
committee members such as reelection, public policy formation, power 
within the chamber, and perhaps higher office.35  Fenno then created a three 
category typology of congressional committees based on the primary goals 
that draw members to that specific committee: reelection committees, policy 
committees, and power in the chamber committees.36  “Member goals are 
less easily characterized in the Senate than in the House” because of the large 
number of committees on which an individual Senator serves and because 
nearly all Senators can get a seat on one of the top four committees.37 
 
 
 
 
 
 29   Rohde, supra note 14, at 219.  
 30   CHRISTOPHER J. DEERING & STEVEN S. SMITH, COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS 11-12 (3RD 
ED. 1997). 
 31   LAUREN COHEN BELL, WARRING FACTIONS: INTEREST GROUPS, MONEY, AND THE NEW 
POLITICS OF SENATE CONFIRMATION 7 (2002). 
 32   MILLER, HIGH PRIESTS, supra note 2, at 139–40.  
 33   For a brief history of some of the most important changes to the committee system in 
the House of Representatives, see MARSHALL & WOLPE, supra note 28, at 5–9.  
 34   FENNO, supra note 17.  
 35   FENNO, supra note 17.  
 36   FENNO, supra note 17.  Some scholars refer to the power in the chamber committees 
as influence committees or prestige committees.  See DEERING & SMITH, supra note 30, at 63.  
 37   FENNO, supra note 17, at 78. 
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Almost all commentators classify the two Judiciary Committees as 
policy committees,38 which attract members (often lawyer-legislators) 
interested in the legalistic, often court-related jurisdiction of the 
committees.39  Both of these committees have been some of the most active 
in their respective chambers.  For instance, from 1947-1968, each committee 
ranked fourth in its chamber for the largest number of roll call floor votes 
held on bills originating in these committees.40  In addition, the House 
Judiciary Committee has had more bills and resolutions referred to it than 
any other committee in the House.41  The Judiciary Committees also hold 
most of the constitutional hearings in Congress.42  For example, from 1995-
2009, the two Judiciary Committees held seventy-two percent of the 
constitutionally-based hearings (or hearings in which constitutional issues 
are prevalent) in the legislative branch.43  Both the House and Senate 
Judiciary Committees have a generally lawyerly decision-making culture 
that is sometimes extremely partisan in nature and thus rife with conflict.44 
The committees also attract the attention of a wide variety of interest 
groups on all sides of the highly controversial issues under their 
jurisdiction.45  Thus, some have referred to the House Judiciary Committee 
like its Senate counterpart as a “national issue committee.”46  As Roger 
Davidson and Oleszek explain, “[t]he Judiciary Committees are buffeted by 
diverse and competing pressure groups that feel passionately on the volatile 
issues such as abortion, school prayer, and gun control.  The committees’ 
chances for achieving agreement among their members or on the floor 
depend to a large extent on their ability to deflect such issues altogether or 
to accommodate diverse groups through artful legislation drafting.”47  The 
 
 38   SEE, E.G., CHARLES S. BULLOCK, III, MOTIVATIONS FOR U.S. CONGRESSIONAL 
COMMITTEE PREFERENCES: FRESHMEN OF THE 92ND CONGRESS, 1 LEGIS. STUDIES Q. 201-12 
(1976); DEERING & SMITH, supra note 30, at 64, 73, 80, 82; F. SCOTT ADLER, WHY 
CONGRESSIONAL REFORMS FAIL 54 (2002); SCOTT A. FRISCH & SEAN Q. KELLY, COMMITTEE 
ASSIGNMENT POLITICS IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 78 (2006). 
 39   MILLER, THE VIEW OF THE COURTS, supra note 2, at 135. 
 40   GEORGE GOODWIN, JR., THE LITTLE LEGISLATURES 106 (1970). 
 41   ROGER H. DAVIDSON, JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY 
104 (Robert A. Katzmann, ed., 1988). 
 42   Neal Devins, Party Polarization and Congressional Committee Considerations of 
Constitutional Questions, 105 NW. U. L. REV 737, 750 (2017). 
 43   Id. 
 44   See generally MILLER, THE VIEWS OF THE COURTS, supra note 2, at 135–38 
(discussing severe partisan division on the House Judiciary Committee). But see C. 
LAWRENCE EVANS, LEADERSHIP IN COMMITTEE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF LEADERSHIP 
BEHAVIOR IN THE U.S. SENATE 60-66 (2001) (DISCUSSING THE VARYING EXTENT OF 
PARTISANSHIP ON THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE). 
 45   GOODWIN, supra note 40, at 102.   
 46   GOODWIN, supra note 40, at 102. 
 47   ROGER H. DAVIDSON & WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESS AND ITS MEMBERS 218 (9th 
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fact that many of these interest groups care deeply about the decisions of the 
federal courts has certainly helped shape the relationships and interactions 
between the two Judiciary Committees and the judicial branch. 
Today, both committees are highly partisan and extremely polarized, 
even more so than their respective chambers.  In the 1950s and 1960s, Senate 
Democrats put an unusually large number of conservatives on the Senate 
Judiciary Committee.48  Since that time, however, both the House and Senate 
Judiciary Committees have usually attracted members from the ideological 
extremes of each party.49  A Republican staffer for the House Judiciary 
Committee explained to me in 2018 that “[t]he Committee draws more 
extreme members who are especially passionate about their pet issues.”50  
Neal Devins agrees with this analysis, noting, “[j]udiciary Committee 
polarization is more extreme than party polarization elsewhere because the 
Judiciary Committees tend to attract especially ideological lawmakers.”51 
Committee assignments are handled by each party in each chamber, but 
members often request assignments to particular committees.52  At times, 
members were eagerly seeking membership on the Judiciary Committees, 
while during other periods the Judiciary Committees became highly 
unattractive.  In the 1950s and 1960s, legislators saw membership on both 
committees as fairly desirable.53  Writing in the late 1980s, Randall Ripley 
argued that the Senate Judiciary Committee was still one of the most 
attractive committee in the Senate.54  In the 1980s, however, members started 
to leave the Senate Judiciary Committee.55  Chairman Joe Biden (D-DE) was 
especially concerned about member recruitment to the committee after the 
all-male and all-white committee voted to confirm Justice Clarence Thomas 
to the Supreme Court in 1991, despite Anita Hill’s allegations of sexual 
harassment against him.56  Following the 1992 elections, Biden personally 
recruited the newly-elected Senator Carol Mosely-Braun (D-IL), an African-
American woman, to the committee along with the newly-elected non-
lawyer Senator Diane Feinstein (D-CA).57  After spending only two years on 
the Judiciary Committee, Senator Mosely-Braun quickly left the Judiciary 
 
ed. 2004). 
 48   RANDALL B. RIPLEY, CONGRESS: PROCESS AND POLICY 151 (4th ed. 1988) 
[HEREINAFTER RIPLEY, CONGRESS]. 
 49   MILLER, HIGH PRIESTS, supra note 2, at 140.  
 50   See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 51   Devins, supra note 432, at 777.  
 52   RIPLEY, CONGRESS, supra note 48, at 155.   
 53   MORRIS OGUL, CONGRESS OVERSEES THE BUREAUCRACY 138-39 (1976). 
 54   RIPLEY, CONGRESS, supra note 48, at 155.   
 55   DEERING & SMITH, supra note 30, at 82. 
 56   DEERING & SMITH, supra note 30, at 82. 
 57   DEERING & SMITH, supra note 30, at 82. 
MILLER (DO NOT DELETE) 4/1/2020  10:53 PM 
2020] JUDICIARY COMMITTEES AND FEDERAL COURTS 215 
Committee when a spot on the Finance Committee opened up.58  Senator 
Feinstein remained on the committee and currently serves as its ranking 
minority member.59 
On the other side of the Capitol, the House Judiciary Committee was 
ranked as the seventh most desirable committee in the House during the 88th-
92nd Congresses (1963-1973) among the twenty standing committees then 
found in the House.60  From 1961-1975, forty percent of the freshmen 
members who requested the House Judiciary Committee listed it as their first 
choice.61  The House Judiciary Committee, however, lost its attractiveness.  
Starting in the 1970s, the House Judiciary Committee had trouble getting 
enough members to fill all the seats on the committee.62  During the 93rd-
97th Congresses (1973-1983), the House Judiciary Committee dropped to 
the thirteenth most desirable committee among the twenty regular standing 
committees,63 in large part because it departed from its traditional civil rights 
legislation.64  Starting in the 1980s, the party leadership in the U.S. House 
had to change the rules in order to attract more Congress people to the 
committee.65  The size of the committee was reduced and the rule that 
required all members to be lawyers was relaxed.66  Today, the House 
Committee has again become fairly large, with forty-one members serving 
on it in 2019.67 
The desirability of the Judiciary Committees has changed over time, 
but the changes have sometimes been uneven between the two parties and 
within factions of each party.  Christopher Deering and Stephen Smith noted 
that in the 1980s, for example, Democrats had trouble recruiting enough 
members to serve on the House Judiciary Committee, while conservative 
Republicans were quite interested in the committee.68  Along these same 
 
 58   DEERING & SMITH, supra note 30, at 82. 
 59   See, e.g., Press Release, Office of Senator Dianne Feinstein,  Feinstein Announces 
New Judiciary Committee Staff Director, (Sept. 20, 2019), 
https://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-
releases?ContentRecord_id=24DF3C2C-F766-4E84-AD41-F4E2B41C20AA 
 60   Malcom Jewell & Chu Chi-Hung, Membership Movement and Committee 
Attractiveness in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1963-1971, 18 AM. J. POL. SCI. 433, 438 
(1974).   
 61   KENNETH A. SHEPSLE, THE GIANT JIGSAW PUZZLE: DEMOCRATIC COMMITTEE 
ASSIGNMENTS IN THE MODERN HOUSE 46 (1978). 
 62   RIPLEY, CONGRESS, supra note 48, at 156. 
 63   Bruce A. Ray, Committee Attractiveness in the U.S. House, 1963-1981, 26 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 609, 610 (1982).   
 64   OGUL, supra note 53, at 151.  
 65   DEERING & SMITH, supra note 30, at 73; MILLER, THE VIEW OF THE COURTS, supra 
note 2, at 137. 
 66   Ray, supra note 63, at 612.   
 67   See The House Judiciary Committee website at https://judiciary.house.gov/. 
 68   DEERING & SMITH, supra note 30, at 73. 
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lines, in their study of the U.S. House from the early 2000s, Scott Frisch and 
Sean Kelly found that newly-elected Republicans were more interested in 
serving on the House Judiciary Committee than were newly-elected 
Democrats.69  On the Democratic side, African-American members have 
often sought out seats on the House Judiciary Committee,70 in part because 
of its more recent return to its prior focus on its civil rights jurisdiction.71  In 
2019, the House Judiciary Committee had eight African-American members, 
two Asian-American members, and three Hispanic/Latino members among 
its forty-one total membership.72  It also had thirteen female members.73 
The Senate Judiciary Committee is especially reflective of the political 
dynamics of its broader chamber.  Thus, minority party members of the 
committee use every possible procedural tactic to delay actions of the 
committee with which they disagree.74  Agreeing with this assessment, a 
staffer to the ranking minority member of the committee once noted, “[t]he 
[Senate] Judiciary Committee is a better reflection of the Senate floor than 
any other.  Everybody uses their procedural rights.  People divide up earlier, 
and it feels like the floor.  There are fights; there’s screaming and yelling; 
and people filibuster in committee.”75  As a Democratic Senate staffer 
summarized the situation for me in a 2017 interview, “[t]he Judiciary 
Committee is less collegial than other committees in the Senate.”76 
The Senate in general—and the Senate Judiciary Committee in 
particular—also kill many bills that the House has endorsed, including most 
of the anti-court legislation passed by the House Judiciary Committee early 
in this century under Chairman Sensenbrenner (R-WI) (to be discussed in 
more detail below).  Comparing the two Judiciary Committees, a former 
Republican staffer who worked on the Senate Judiciary Committee told me, 
“[T]he Senate Judiciary Committee stops extreme measures passed by the 
House because of the threat of filibusters in that chamber.  The House doesn’t 
have to worry about filibusters.  Their members can be as extreme as they 
choose to be.”77  My more recent interviews indicate that this trend is 
continuing.  As one former Republican Senate staffer told me in 2017, “[t]he 
Senate Judiciary Committee stopped everything coming from the House.”78  
As one lobbyist said in 2017, “[t]he Senate is a shield against the hyperactive 
 
 69   FRISCH & KELLY, supra note 38, at 106.  
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House.”79  Marshall and Wolpe confirm this conclusion when they note, 
“[w]ith the growing levels of partisanship, the contemporary Senate has 
earned a reputation as a legislative graveyard.”80  The Senate Judiciary 
Committee has certainly served as the legislative graveyard for anti-court 
legislation passed by the House or considered by the House Judiciary 
Committee. 
A number of my interviewees compared the House and Senate and their 
respective Judiciary Committees.  As one lobbyist told me in 2018, “[t]he 
Senate is slower, more moderate, and more deliberative than the House.”81  
Another lobbyist told me in 2017 that she preferred working with Senate 
staffers because they “were more consistent and more stable.  There is too 
much turnover among committee members and staff in the House.”82  Many 
of my interviewees said that, traditionally, the Senate Committee was less 
partisan than its House counterpart, although that norm may be changing.83  
The House would also pass more extreme legislation than the Senate.84  
Further, it is worth noting that since Reconstruction, seventy-eight percent 
of court-curbing legislation introduced in Congress has originated in the 
House, while only twenty-two percent has started in the U.S. Senate.85  Of 
course, it is important to remember that very few of these bills have ever 
been enacted into law. 
The House Judiciary Committee has long been known for its “court like 
deliberative style and lawyerlike committee culture,”86 because so many 
lawyer-legislators have served on it.87  Jackie Koszczuk and Amy Stern have 
described the House Judiciary Committee as a forum “where passionate and 
combative oratory is generally the order of the day.”88  Despite its lawyerlike 
style and culture, the House Judiciary Committee nevertheless reflects the 
highly partisan and ideologically polarized nature of the broader House of 
Representatives.  As a lobbyist described the House committee: “The true 
believers come to the House Judiciary Committee.  There are bomb hurlers 
on both sides of that committee.”89  A Democratic Senate staffer noted in 
2017 that there is no minority voice on the House Judiciary Committee,  just 
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as there is little role for members of the minority party in the broader House 
chamber.90  When asked to compare the House and Senate Judiciary 
Committees, another Democratic Senate staffer told me in 2017 that, “[t]he 
committee is much bigger in the House and it has a broader range of 
extremists in both parties than in the Senate.”91  Another Democratic Senate 
staffer explained that, “[t]he House Committee is more stage-managed than 
the Senate Judiciary,” meaning the committee chair has a great deal of power 
in the House, while individual Senators have a greater voice on the Senate 
Committee.92  A former Democratic Senate staffer said that the Senate 
Judiciary Committee gets more attention than its House counterpart because 
of its role in judicial confirmations, but the House Judiciary Committee 
focuses more on the substance of proposed legislation than does the Senate 
Committee.93  The Judiciary Committees are also the dominant voice in 
Congress on constitutional issues.94 
III. JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS AND CONFIRMATIONS 
Of course, one key difference between the House and Senate Judiciary 
Committees is the fact that only the Senate Judiciary Committee considers 
presidential nominations for the federal bench.  Although the full Senate 
must give its advice and consent to all presidential nominations, the process 
for federal judicial nominees begins in the Senate Judiciary Committee 
before going to the full Senate.  As Lauren Bell has noted, “[p]residents 
routinely fill more federal judgeships than any other office.”95  The House 
does not play a role in confirming federal judges, so one could argue that 
Senators on the Senate Judiciary Committee are more familiar with federal 
judges because of the Committee’s role in the nomination process.  One 
might also assume that the Senate’s nomination process for federal judges 
would mean that the Senate Judiciary Committee might have better 
relationships with federal judges than their House Judiciary Committee 
counterparts.  Over the years, however, various interviewees, including 
federal judges, have told me that individual judges rarely contact the Senate 
Judiciary Committee or its members directly over policy issues.96  Instead, 
these Senators would defer to the lobbyists who work in the Administrative 
Office of the U.S. Courts who lobby on behalf of the Judicial Conference, 
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the policy making arm of the federal judiciary.97  Since federal judges rarely 
contact members of the House or Senate Judiciary Committees directly after 
they have been confirmed, the structural differences in their roles in judicial 
confirmations may not automatically translate into differences between the 
two committees in their relationships with the federal courts. 
Senators have often used judicial confirmation hearings as a 
mechanism to send signals to the judges regarding the past rulings they 
oppose and what kinds of future decisions they would like to see from the 
courts.  As Michael Gerhardt explains, “Senators, and presidents, employ 
their authority over appointments to impress their constitutional views upon 
other institutions (and the public).”98  At the hearings, Senators may ask a lot 
of questions about the nominees’ views on judicial activism and other 
judicial philosophies.99  Thus, the Senators are trying to figure out how the 
nominees may rule on future controversies.  In today’s world, most judicial 
nominees refuse to give direct answers to these questions.100  In fact, the 
judicial confirmation process is dreaded by many judicial nominees and the 
process could have prolonged effects on future interactions between 
Congress and the courts.  As Ross Baker explains, “[i]n recent years, justices 
of the Supreme Court have emerged badly battered from the polarized, 
partisan, and contentious confirmation process in the Senate, so it would not 
be surprising if they were to harbor lingering bitterness towards the 
politicians who subjected them to harsh and lengthy interrogation.”101 
This section will look at the confirmation process in greater detail.  
Once the president nominates a judge to the federal bench for the U.S. 
District Courts, the U.S. Court of Appeals, or the U.S. Supreme Court, the 
nomination is then referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee.  In addition 
to the vetting process by the FBI102 and the American Bar Association 
(“ABA”),103 the Senate Judiciary Committee staff conducts its own 
investigation into the candidates, including their answers to a lengthy 
questionnaire from the committee.104  Since some Republican presidents 
such as President George W. Bush and President Donald Trump have viewed 
the ABA as a partisan and liberal organization, they did not submit the names 
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of nominees to the ABA before they submitted them to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee.105  In these cases, the Committee requests ABA ratings of the 
nominees after the names have been made public instead of receiving them 
at the same time that the Committee receives the name of the nominee from 
the White House.  The GOP’s unhappiness with the ABA is somewhat 
surprising, since the organization has traditionally been very conservative.  
Regardless, today, most conservatives view the ABA as leaning too far 
left.106  Individual members of the Judiciary Committee may also request 
written answers to questions in addition to the committee questionnaire.  The 
Committee also seeks written information from interest groups and the 
general public in its investigatory stage.107 
Once the committee staff members conclude their investigation of the 
nominees, the committee chair will then decide whether it will hold a hearing 
on the nomination.108  Generally, the nomination dies if there is no committee 
hearing.109  In addition to having almost complete control over the question 
of whether or not a nominee will get a hearing, the committee chair also 
controls the witness list for the hearings, including what role interest groups 
will play in the hearing process.110  For example, when Senator Ted Kennedy 
(D-MA) chaired the Senate Judiciary Committee from 1978-1981, interest 
groups participated in a large percentage of judicial confirmation hearings.111  
However, when Strom Thurmond (R-SC) took over the chairmanship from 
1981-1987, interest group participation dropped dramatically.112  Under Joe 
Biden’s (D-DE) stewardship from 1987-1995, interest group participation in 
confirmation hearings again increased, but it dropped when Senator Orin 
Hatch (R-UT) gained the chairmanship of the committee from 1995-2001.113  
Thus, it appears that Democrats are more open to interest group participation 
in the confirmation hearings than are Republican committee chairs. 
The decision to hold a hearing for lower court nominees usually 
involves the norm or tradition of Senatorial Courtesy, including the so-called 
Blue Slip process explained below.  Since each U.S. District Court is located 
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within a specific state, Senators would invoke the norm of Senatorial 
Courtesy and would refuse to vote for a nominee opposed by the home-state 
Senator if the Senator was a member of the same political party as the 
president.  Many presidents went one step further and deferred to the 
Senators of their political party and from that particular state before 
nominating someone for a federal trial court opening.114  In other words, 
Senators often suggested names for judicial openings in their states and many 
presidents would simply nominate the Senator’s choice.  This patronage 
approach seemed to meet the political needs of many Senators and of many 
presidents.115  For the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, by tradition, although 
not by statute, each seat belongs to a single state except for those on the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit.116  The Senate Judiciary Committee has often 
deferred to the home-state Senators of the nominees about U.S. Court of 
Appeals nominations as well.117 
The Blue Slip process is an informal procedure governed by tradition.  
Typically, the chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee would send a blue 
slip of paper to each of the home-state Senators regardless of party for each 
lower court judicial nominee from their state.118  The custom began as early 
as 1917,119 although its modern manifestation dates from 1956.120  If the 
Senator supported the nomination, then they would return the blue slip to the 
committee chair.121  If they opposed the nominee, then they would either note 
their opposition on the blue slip or would never return the slip to the 
committee.122  When faced with opposition to a nominee from a home-state 
Senator regardless of party, the chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee 
would usually refuse to schedule a hearing on that nominee, effectively 
killing that nomination.123  While the norm of Senatorial Courtesy seems to 
have applied only to Senators from the president’s party, the 
institutionalization of the blue slip tradition gave a veto to home-state 
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Senators from either party.124  The blue slip process today also provides a 
paper trail to track the progress of judicial nominations,125 considering that 
since 2001, the chairs of the Senate Judiciary Committee have publicized 
whether blue slips were returned for any given nominee.126 
The issue of giving an absolute veto to home-state Senators over 
judicial nominees from their states regardless of party has given rise to 
different interpretations of the blue slip tradition by different Judiciary 
Committee chairs.  As Amy Steigerwalt notes, “[m]uch like other informal 
Senate customs, a negative blue slip is only as powerful as the Senate 
leadership, in this case the Judiciary Committee chair, allows it to be.”127  
One of the key determinants of how a Judiciary Committee chair will 
approach the blue slip process seems to be whether the Senate and the 
President are controlled by the same party or different political parties.128 
For many chairs of the Senate Judiciary Committee over the years, the 
refusal to return a blue slip or noting opposition to a nominee on a returned 
blue slip has prevented the chair from calling a hearing regarding that 
nomination.129  Without a hearing, the nomination effectively dies.130  
However, different Judiciary Committee chairs have interpreted the norm 
differently.  For example, starting in 1956, Chairman James Eastland (D-
MS) apparently treated a single negative blue slip or the failure to return one 
as an absolute veto on the nomination.131  However, Chairman Ted Kennedy 
(D-MA) changed that approach when he became chair of the committee in 
1979.132  For example, in 1980, Kennedy held hearings on a nominee from 
North Carolina over the objections of Senator Jessie Helms (R-NC).133  
Chairman Strom Thurmond (R-SC) ignored Democratic objections to some 
of President Reagan’s lower court nominees following the 1980 election, 
although he did allow Republican Senators to veto nominees for the U.S. 
Court of Appeals.134  Coming to power after the 1986 elections, Chairman 
Joe Biden (D-DE) often ignored the objections of his Democratic colleagues 
and held hearings on Reagan and Bush nominees.135  With a Democrat in the 
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White House, Chairman Orin Hatch (R-UT) reinstituted the blue slip veto 
tradition.136  However, Hatch (R-UT) refused to follow the blue slip custom 
starting in 2003 when Republicans gained unified control of the White House 
and the Senate.137  At times, he held hearings on nominees even when both 
home-state Democratic Senators opposed them.138  These controversial 
nominations were often filibustered when they reached the Senate floor.139  
In 2005, Chairman Arlen Specter (R-PA) returned to the single Senator veto 
practice on blue slips.140 
When Democrat Chairman Patrick Leahy (D-VT) took control of the 
committee in 2001, and again in 2007, he instituted a rule that one negative 
blue slip would slow down a nomination and two negative blue slips would 
kill it.141  Chairman Chuck Grassley (R-IA) followed this same practice 
during the Obama administration.142  After President Trump’s election, and 
under considerable pressure from Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell 
(R-KY) and other prominent conservatives, Grassley announced a new blue 
slip policy that, for the first time, would treat U.S. Court of Appeals 
nominees differently than those nominated for the U.S. District Courts.143  
Grassley said he would likely honor a single negative blue slip for a district 
court nominee, but not for a circuit court nominee because the circuit courts 
cover multiple states and are more important nationally.144  Grassley held 
hearings on a variety of Trump appellate nominees despite the fact that one 
home-state Senator objected.145  In 2019, new Judiciary Committee 
Chairman Lindsey Graham (R-SC) went a step further, stating that, “[t]he 
blue slip process for circuit judges are [sic] not gonna [sic] be allowed to 
become a veto.”146  In February of 2019, the Senate confirmed a Ninth 
Circuit nominee even though both home-state Senators refused to return their 
blue slips.147  It was the first time in history that the Senate had confirmed a 
federal judge over the opposition of both home-state Senators.148 
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On the other hand, nominations to the U.S. Supreme Court have always 
been politicized.149 Since 1939, almost all presidential nominees for the U.S. 
Supreme Court have faced confirmation hearings before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee.150  While many commentators question the value of these 
Supreme Court confirmation hearings, others note that the hearings are a 
clear public forum for Senators and others to send clear messages to the 
nominees about important issues of constitutional and statutory 
interpretation.151  In other words, the confirmation hearings are clear 
signaling devices in the institutional dialogue between Congress and the 
federal courts regarding judicial decisions.152  Supreme Court nominees do 
not face the blue slip process.  Nevertheless, the Committee chair has a great 
deal of discretion about whether or when to schedule confirmation hearings 
for the nominee.153  For example, Senator Majority Leader Mitch McConnell 
(R-KY) refused to allow Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Grassley (R-
IA) to hold hearings on President Obama’s nomination of Judge Merrick 
Garland to the U.S. Supreme Court in 2016.154  McConnell argued that the 
Senate should not consider a Supreme Court nominee during a presidential 
election year.155  McConnell’s role in halting the committee hearings for 
Judge Garland was confirmed in many of my more recent interviews.156 
Traditionally, the Senate would easily confirm the vast majority of the 
President’s nominees for federal judgeships at all levels.  In fact, before the 
1980’s, the Senate confirmed about ninety percent of presidential judicial 
nominees.157  High confirmation rates were especially true for lower court 
nominations, although Supreme Court nominees have historically received 
more scrutiny from the Senate.158  The notable exceptions to presidential 
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success in judicial nominations were, for example, when a coalition of 
Republicans and conservative Democrats successfully filibustered the 
nomination of Abe Fortas to be Chief Justice in 1968 and when the Senate 
rejected President Nixon’s nominations to the Supreme Court of Clement 
Haynsworth and G. Harold Carswell in 1969 and 1970, respectively.159  
Many commentators point to the rejection of President Reagan’s nomination 
of Judge Robert Bork to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1987 and the role of 
interest groups in that fight as the start of the modern era of highly contested 
judicial nominations in the U.S. Senate.160  As a result, between 1981 and 
2014, the percentage of judicial confirmations dropped to about sixty-five 
percent.161  Recently, interest groups have become more involved in all 
judicial nominations, including those for the lower federal courts.162  This 
heightened interest group involvement has clearly changed the nomination 
and confirmation processes for lower federal judgeships.163 
Evidence of this new era is demonstrated by the fact that the Senate 
filibustered or otherwise delayed a variety of Clinton, George W. Bush,164 
and eventually Obama nominations165 to the federal bench.  Thus, as the 
Senate has grown more ideologically polarized, the confirmation process has 
also become more contentious and more partisan in nature.  As Barbara 
Sinclair notes, “[p]arty polarization has made the confirmation process an 
increasingly confrontational one.”166  The same ideological and interest 
group battles over legislation in the Senate have carried over to its 
confirmation of presidential appointees.167  As Bell has argued, “the Senate’s 
confirmation process has become little more than an extension of its 
legislative work.”168 
In the full Senate, the motion to consider a presidential nomination is 
not debatable, but the motion to approve the nomination is.169  Therefore, for 
an extended period in the history of the Senate, all presidential nominations, 
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including judicial nominations, were subject to the filibuster.170  This 
changed in 2013 when the Democratically controlled Senate invoked the so-
called “nuclear option” and eliminated the filibuster for many executive 
branch nominees and for lower federal court nominees.171  In 2017, the 
Republican controlled Senate then eliminated the filibuster for U.S. Supreme 
Court nominees in order to get then Judge Neil Gorsuch confirmed to the 
high court.172 
Aside from the notable battles over nominees to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, most of the modern judicial confirmation fights involved 
controversial nominations to the U.S. Courts of Appeals.173  However, during 
the Obama Administration, Republican Senators took the conflict to a new 
level when they filibustered judicial nominees for the first time who were 
supported by their Republican home-state colleagues.174  In addition, for the 
first time, a nomination to the U.S. District Court was almost blocked by a 
successful filibuster in 2011 during the Obama Administration.175  
According to one Democratic Senate aide speaking in 2011, “[the GOP] have 
approached district court nominees with the same exacting inquiry standards 
that used to be reserved for the Supreme Court and for controversial circuit 
court nominees.  But now it extends to every lifetime appointment.”176 
IV. ROUTINE AND NON-ROUTINE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND 
THE COURTS 
In overall terms, sometimes the relationship between Congress and the 
federal courts is cooperative and sometimes it is highly contentious.  It is 
quite routine for politicians to criticize court decisions with which they 
disagree, but it is much less common for Congress as a whole to curb the 
judicial branch’s institutional powers.  Interest groups often urge politicians 
to take issue with particular judicial decisions, and the politicians find this 
criticism to be an easy way to score points with those who are unhappy with 
a specific court ruling.  The introduction of court-curbing legislation may 
also be a low-cost signaling device, allowing politicians to express their 
displeasure with the courts and/or with specific court decisions, since they 
know that there is not a high probability that these measures will actually 
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become law.177  As Stephen Engel concludes, “[p]olitical attacks on the 
federal courts that do not result in undermining judicial power could be a 
win-win for all sides.”178 
The Constitution protects the independence of federal judges by giving 
them life terms and by prohibiting Congress from reducing their salaries.179  
Of course, this does not mean that Congress must give the judges annual cost 
of living increases or otherwise increase their incomes.  However, when 
Congress is unhappy with the federal courts it has a variety of weapons it can 
use to attack judicial power.180  These include overturning statutory 
interpretation decisions of the courts by passing a new statute, passing 
constitutional amendments meant to overturn the courts’ constitutionally-
based decisions (although at times Congress has enacted mere statutes that 
were intended to overturn constitutional decisions), restricting the budgets 
and salaries of the federal courts, changing the structure and/or number of 
judges on specific courts, restricting the courts’ jurisdiction, creating an 
Inspector General for the judiciary, and impeaching federal judges.181  
Congress, of course, can ignore a judicial decision with which it disagrees.182  
When Congress does attempt to curb the courts, it often does so through the 
two Judiciary Committees.183 
There are some routine interactions between Congress and the courts 
that receive very little scholarly or other attention and are therefore usually 
non-conflictual.  For example, Congress seems to regularly pass deliberately 
ambiguous statutes, knowing that the courts will probably fix them.184  
Congress may also want to shift various issues to the courts in an attempt to 
protect these policies from future unsympathetic voters and legislators.  As 
Pickerill explains, “Elected officials might also want to empower courts as a 
way of entrenching policies and programs that they believe are becoming 
vulnerable to new or emerging electoral majorities.”185  On the other hand, 
the Supreme Court and other federal courts routinely invite Congress to 
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overturn their statutory interpretation decisions if the current majority in 
Congress might disagree with the judicial pronouncement.186  Sometimes 
these invitations to override come directly from the dissent.187  These 
interactions therefore do not produce much friction between the branches.  
As Pickerill has noted, “[t]hose who expect a constitutional revolution, a 
constitutional moment, or other form of severe confrontation between the 
Court and Congress simply do not appreciate the more routine and typical 
type of interaction between the Court and Congress in the political 
process.”188 
Some of the routine interactions between Congress and the courts are 
based on the fact that Congress must approve annual appropriations for the 
federal judiciary.189  These appropriations include funding for construction 
of new federal courthouses, for staff salaries, for technology and security 
needs, for judicial libraries, and for other operating expenses.190  These 
budget issues can also involve salaries for federal judges.191  Although 
individual legislators have often threatened to use congressional budget 
powers against the federal courts in order to retaliate for judicial decisions 
that they do not like,192 Congress as a whole has rarely done so.  
Nevertheless, the annual budget process does provide the prospect of conflict 
between Congress and the courts.  As I have written previously, “[t]he annual 
appropriations process provides a clear avenue to see the different 
institutional perspectives of the [federal courts] and of Congress.  The courts 
rightly see themselves as an independent third branch and many judges seem 
to resent Congress’s interference with their budget requests.”193  Congress, 
on the other hand, “often views the federal courts as just one more federal 
agency begging for funds.”194  These routine interactions between the courts 
and Congress may appear to be conflictual, but generally are not.  As George 
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Lovell has written, “the appearance of conflict between independent 
branches frequently masks more cooperative interaction between 
interdependent branches.”195 
The exceptions to this norm of budgetary comity between the two 
institutions stand out.  For example, in 1964 Congress granted twice the 
annual cost of living increase for lower court federal judicial salaries as they 
did for the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court in order to signal their 
dissatisfaction with various rulings from the high court.196  Nevertheless, 
some politicians have still clamored for Congress to use its budgetary powers 
against the courts.  For example, in 2005 the then Majority Leader of the 
House Tom DeLay (R-TX) bellowed, “[w]e set up the courts.  We can unset 
the courts.  We have the power of the purse.”197  At about the same time, 
Representative Steve King (R-IA), then a member of the House Judiciary 
Committee, expressed his frustration with the federal courts by proclaiming, 
“[w]hen their budget starts to dry up, we’ll get their attention.”198 
At other times, the interactions between the two branches are less 
routine in part because Congress ultimately decides how to structure the 
federal courts and their jurisdictions.  Congress decides how many judges 
will serve on each U.S. District Court, the U.S. Courts of Appeals, and the 
U.S. Supreme Court.  For example, in 1977, 1984, and in 1990, Congress 
greatly expanded the number of judgeships on the U.S. District Courts, 
suddenly giving the president many more judicial nominations than his 
predecessors.199  The policymaking arm of the federal judiciary, the Judicial 
Conference, makes recommendations on the courts that require additional 
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judges,200 but Congress often ignores those suggestions.201  Congress also 
determines the boundaries of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, occasionally 
redrawing those boundaries for workload or ideological reasons.  For 
example, following the lead of its Judiciary Committees, Congress in 1980 
split the old Fifth Circuit and moved the states of Florida, Georgia, and 
Alabama to the new Eleventh Circuit for both political and management 
reasons.202  Today, many conservatives would like to split the current Ninth 
Circuit because of its perceived liberal decisions.203  When Republicans 
controlled the House Judiciary Committee, that committee held various 
hearings over the years on the issue, as did the Senate Judiciary 
Committee.204  Congress also sets the number of justices on the U.S. 
Supreme Court, and historically Congress has altered the number of justices 
to fit its political needs at the time. 205  Notably, Congress refused to enact 
Franklin Roosevelt’s Court Packing Plan, in part because it seems that 
having nine justices on the Supreme Court has become constitutionalized in 
the American voters’ minds.206 
Because the House has no role in judicial confirmations, some argue 
that the House Judiciary Committee pays extra attention to the issue of how 
many judges should serve on the U.S. District Courts and other federal 
courts.  As Binder and Maltzman have argued: 
From the vantage of the House, legislators have 
constitutional authority to make decisions about the 
structure of the bench, but not about who sits on the 
bench. . . . Regardless of whether party control is unified or 
divided, the creation of new judgeships provides an 
electorally valuable opportunity for credit claiming.  Even if 
new judgeships are not created within one’s state or district, 
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House members can claim credit for acting to improve the 
efficiency of the courts.207 
Interestingly, Binder and Maltzman conclude that in the House Judiciary 
Committee, new judgeships are created to benefit representatives from both 
political parties and to allow both parties to claim credit, while the Senate 
Judiciary Committee prefers to give more judgeships to states represented 
on the Committee by members of the president’s political party.208 
There have been various periods throughout history when the conflicts 
between the federal courts and the elected branches have been more 
pronounced.  President Thomas Jefferson and his Democratic-Republican 
Party allies in Congress believed that a life term for federal judges 
maintained the Federalist Party policies that Jefferson’s election seemed to 
repudiate.  As Charles Geyh has written, “[t]he election of Thomas Jefferson 
ushered in the first sustained wave of national anger directed at federal 
judges.”209  The Jeffersonians in Congress promptly eliminated sixteen new 
judgeships for the federal circuit courts that the Federalists had hastily 
created before they lost power in Congress (the so-called Midnight 
Judges),210 and they further prevented the Supreme Court from meeting for 
one year.211  The Supreme Court acquiesced to these actions.  The 
Jeffersonians then attempted to impeach federal judges (including Supreme 
Court justices) who they felt were too strongly partisan members of the 
Federalist Party.  The Senate refused to remove most of these judges from 
office, including Justice Samuel Chase, thus setting the precedent that 
federal judges would not be removed from the bench merely because of their 
rulings.212  President Andrew Jackson was also no friend of the federal courts 
and preferred to ignore the courts when they made rulings with which he did 
not agree.  Although apocryphal, he is often quoted as saying in response to 
the Supreme Court’s unpopular ruling in Worcester v. Georgia,213 “John 
Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it.”214 
President Lincoln vowed never to allow judges to get in the way of his 
mission to save the Union during the Civil War.  In attacking the authority 
of the highest court in the country, Lincoln said, “[t]he candid citizen must 
confess that if the policy of the Government upon vital questions affecting 
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the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme 
Court . . . the people will have ceased to be their own rulers.”215  After the 
Civil War, the Radical Republicans in Congress changed the number of 
justices on the U.S. Supreme Court several times to meet their political 
needs, expanding it to ten during the Lincoln presidency and then reducing 
the Court to seven members in the Johnson Administration in order to 
prevent the Democratic president from replacing several retiring justices.216  
They also prevented the Court from hearing cases in which the justices might 
have declared Reconstruction to be unconstitutional.217 
Coming from the left, the Populists and Progressives in Congress 
routinely attacked the legitimacy of the conservative activist U.S. Supreme 
Court and other federal courts in the late 1800’s and the early 1900’s.218  
These groups advocated reforms to reduce judicial power, which included: 
requiring the popular election of federal judges, allowing Congress to 
overturn Supreme Court rulings with a two-thirds vote, requiring the vote of 
seven justices before a law could be declared unconstitutional, and ending 
life terms for federal judges by instituting voter recall provisions.219  Senator 
Robert La Follette, running for president in 1924 as the Progressive Party 
candidate, called federal judges “petty tyrants and arrogant despots.”220  
Along these same lines, President Theodore Roosevelt once said that, “I may 
not know much law, but I do know that one can put the fear of God in 
judges.”221  And, of course, President Franklin Roosevelt was so unhappy 
with the Supreme Court declaring his New Deal programs to be 
unconstitutional that he proposed his infamous “Court Packing Plan” in 
order to almost double the size of the Court and allow him to appoint a 
majority of the justices.222  Congress refused to enact this proposal, but they 
did pass an early retirement program that gave Roosevelt enough 
appointments to place his allies to control the Court’s majority.223 
Since the 1950s, conservative politicians and the interest groups 
supporting them have routinely attacked the federal courts because of their 
perceived liberal bias.224  Conservatives were especially upset with the 
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liberal activism of the Warren Court and often called for Chief Justice 
Warren to be impeached.225  In 1964, Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ), the 
Republican candidate for president, made the judiciary a significant 
campaign issue.226  In 1968, while running for president, Richard Nixon 
made “law and order” and attacks on liberal activist judges central themes in 
his campaign.227  In 1970, then Minority Leader of the U.S. House, 
Representative Gerald Ford (R-MI) called for the impeachment of Justice 
William O. Douglas, at least in part because of his liberal views.228  In his 
1980 and 1984 campaigns for president, Ronald Reagan also made attacks 
on the federal courts an important campaign issue.229 
In fact, all of the Republican Party platforms since 1976 have made 
negative statements about the federal judiciary, with some members even 
calling for Congress to enact court-stripping or jurisdiction stripping 
legislation against the federal courts.230  On the other hand, the platforms of 
the Democratic Party did not include any such anti-court references in the 
same time period.231  Conservative opposition to the courts continues today.  
When running for president in 2016, Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX), a member of 
the Senate Judiciary Committee, supported a variety of proposals advanced 
by the Religious Right to curb the power of the courts, including ending life 
terms by imposing retention elections for U.S. Supreme Court justices.232  
Senator Cruz said, “[t]o see the court behaving as it is today, as a super-
legislature, simply enacting the policy preferences of the elite judges who 
are serving upon it, is a profound betrayal of their judicial oaths of office and 
of the constitutional design that has protected our liberty for over two 
centuries.”233  President Donald Trump has routinely attacked federal judges 
in highly personal ways when they issued decisions with which he 
disagreed.234  For example, President Trump complained that U.S. District 
Judge Gonzalo Curiel could not remain impartial in a fraud case dealing with 
Trump University because of his Mexican heritage.235  The President also 
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criticized U.S. District Judge Amy Berman Jackson’s handling of the 
criminal case of his friend, Roger Stone.236  Trump also called for Justices 
Sotomayor and Ginsburg to recuse themselves from any cases about the 
president or his personal finances in part because of their criticism of the 
Trump Administration’s legal strategy.237 
The early 2000s seemed to be the low point in the inter-institutional 
relationship between Congress and the federal courts.  During interviews I 
conducted in 2006 before the midterm elections, I heard this relationship 
described as “venomous,” “hostile,” “tense,” “deteriorating,” “contentious,” 
“animosity,” “strained,” and “adversarial.”238  One liberal U.S. 
Representative told me that, “[t]he relationship between the Congress and 
the federal courts is at an all-time low.”239  The same year, another liberal 
Member of Congress told me, “[t]here is less respect for the independence 
of the courts today.”240  In his research, Clark found the period between 
2001-2008 was one of the highest in modern history for the introduction of 
court-curbing legislation in Congress.241  About the same time, Baker 
described the inter-institutional relationship among the judicial and 
legislative branches as, “mutual wariness, suspicion, jealousy, and even a bit 
of spite.”242 
Even Justice Sandra Day O’Connor agreed with these concerns, stating 
in 2004 that the relationship between Congress and the federal courts was 
“more tense than at any time in my lifetime.”243  Justice Ginsburg agreed, 
stating that the judiciary was “under assault in a way that I haven’t seen 
before.”244  In 2005, Newsweek ran a story entitled, “The War on Judges,” 
which concluded that, “concern over the rising tide of anti-judge rhetoric has 
rocked even the Supreme Court.  Though judges were pulled into the culture 
wars before, lately the animosity—and a range of new efforts to curb judicial 
power—have reached fever pitch.”245  As Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in 
his 2004 annual report, “[c]riticism of judges has dramatically increased in 
recent years, exacerbating in some respects the strained relationship between 
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the Congress and the federal judiciary.”246  Summarizing the alarm that many 
felt about the increased attacks on the judiciary during this period, Geyh 
concluded that, “[s]ome have likened the relationship between courts and 
Congress to a conversation or dialogue, but such measured and civil 
exchanges do not capture the rough and tumble of the interaction in its 
ordinary course the way a schoolyard fracas does.”247 
During this period, Congress expressed its displeasure with the federal 
courts in various ways.  For example, the House and Senate Judiciary 
Committees held a variety of hearings to express their displeasure with 
federal judges, some of which were aimed at attacking specific court 
decisions such as the one in Kelo v. City of New London (2005), where the 
Supreme Court ruled that local governments had the right to define the 
phrase “public use” in the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment.248  In a 
2005 hearing before a House Judiciary Committee subcommittee, 
Representative Tom Feeney (R-FL) said that the Kelo decision was 
“indicative of the larger trend in the Court to substitute their own prejudices 
and biases for the constitutional language itself.”249  Speaking as a supporter 
of the Religious Right, Feeney went on to call for Congress to examine the 
religious faith of any nominee to the high court.250  Earlier in his 
congressional career, Feeney authored an amendment on the House floor 
requiring the Department of Justice to monitor individual federal judges who 
deviated from the federal criminal sentencing guidelines.251  The ABA, the 
American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”), and even Chief Justice 
Rehnquist strongly opposed Feeney’s  amendment.252  As I have written 
previously, “[f]ederal judges saw this move as a clear attack on judicial 
independence, because they perceived that the next step was impeachment 
for federal trial judges who deviated from the guidelines.”253 
Sometimes the hearings took on broader topics, like the use of foreign 
court decisions as persuasive precedent in American courts.254  Various 
politicians and interest groups called for the impeachment of any judges who 
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cited foreign judicial decisions in any form.255  As one interest group 
spokesperson for a Religious Right group stated in 2005 at a conference 
entitled, “Remedies to Judicial Tyranny,” “if about forty [federal judges] get 
impeached, suddenly a lot of these guys would be retiring.”256  Although 
Congress has never removed a federal judge merely for their political views 
or for their judicial rulings, the threat of impeachment remains a weapon 
some would like to use against federal judges with whom they disagree.  The 
standards for impeachment are not clear.  For example, in advocating for the 
impeachment of Justice William O. Douglas, then House Minority Leader 
Gerald Ford (R-MI) argued that an “impeachable offense is whatever a 
majority of the House of Representatives considers it to be at any given 
moment in history.”257 
An angry Congress may also prevent the federal courts from hearing 
certain types of cases through a process known as jurisdiction stripping, or 
court-stripping.258  Congress creates federal court jurisdiction, and many 
argue that the legislative branch can also take this jurisdiction away.  During 
Reconstruction, Congress was successful in stripping the Supreme Court of 
jurisdiction in some cases such as Ex Parte McCardle (1869).259  
Notwithstanding, the Court rejected similar attempts in United States v. 
Klein (1872).260  Thus, the limits on the power of Congress to strip the federal 
courts of jurisdiction remain unclear.  Nonetheless, in the late 1800s and 
early 1900s, Progressives and Populists called for the legislative branch to 
enact court-stripping legislation, similar to what conservatives have done 
since the 1950s, because of their perception that the Supreme Court had 
become a liberal activist court.261  When Congress included court-stripping 
provisions in the Military Commissions Act of 2006, the Supreme Court 
promptly ignored them and declared portions of the underlying act 
unconstitutional.262 
Although conceptually different from court-stripping, the House 
Judiciary Committee in 2006 did pass another attack on the federal courts 
when it approved a bill to create an Inspector General for the federal courts.  
Inspectors General have long served in the executive branch, auditing the 
actions and expenditures of their federal agencies and departments, and 
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reporting their conclusions directly to Congress.263  The proposed judiciary 
Inspector General legislation was strongly opposed by federal judges and 
others, who saw it as another attempt to promote the impeachment of judges 
with whom the conservatives disagreed.264  The bill was not considered by 
the full House nor by the Senate Judiciary Committee.265  As I have written 
previously, “[h]aving an inspector general for the federal judiciary would 
skew the continuing dialogue between Congress and the courts, as well as 
potentially harm both the institutional and the decisional independence of the 
judiciary.”266 
The Religious Right and/or the Tea Party Movement prompted many 
of the attacks on the judiciary during this time period.267  Both movements 
and the interest groups associated with them comprised important parts of 
the Republican coalition.268  Geyh summarized the views of the Religious 
Right regarding the role of judges in our society in this way: “[f]or this new 
breed of Christian conservative, natural law trumps all, and judges who are 
serious about the rule of law should interpret and apply constitutional, 
statutory, and common law in a manner consistent with the higher teachings 
of God.”269  Thus, conservatives seemed to care much more about judicial 
appointments than did liberals.270  As one Democratic staffer in the U.S. 
Senate told me in a 2017 interview, the strong support from evangelicals and 
others in the Religious Right and President Trump’s election have seemed to 
end the conservative attacks on the federal courts.271  Many of my 
interviewees over the years have explained that conservatives care much 
more about the federal courts than do liberals, and conservatives were 
leading the charge against the federal courts in the early part of this 
century.272  As a former Democratic Senate staffer told me in 2017, “[t]he 
GOP leadership pushes hard on judges because the Republican base makes 
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judicial confirmations a high priority.  On the left, however, voters don’t 
connect judges with policy.”273 
Others have argued that alarm over the tense relationship between the 
courts and Congress at the beginning of the current century was overblown, 
in large part because Congress as a whole took very little action to restrict 
judicial power, despite all of the anti-court rhetoric coming from various 
members of the legislative branch.274  Therefore, Pickerilll concluded that, 
“[w]hile a number of attacks on the courts may seem ill-advised and 
impolitic, they do not constitute a serious threat to the U.S. judiciary.”275  
Summarizing much of this line of argument, Geyh concluded that, 
“[a]lthough Congress has threatened the judiciary’s independence on any 
number of occasions, it has rarely made good on those threats.”276  David 
O’Brien agreed, noting that efforts to restrict the power of the federal courts 
in general and the Supreme Court in particular have very rarely been enacted, 
and thus “[c]ourt-curbing legislation is not a very effective weapon . . . .  
Most proposals to curb the Court, of course, are simply that.”277 
Many scholars have long felt that broad public support for the work of 
the federal courts has protected them from many of these institutional 
attacks.278  O’Brien refers to this as the “myth of the cult of the robe.”279  
Geyh argues that the courts are protected from the most dangerous 
institutional attacks because over the years, Congress and the courts have 
reached a “dynamic equilibrium” that favors judicial independence.280  Even 
in the current era of extreme political polarization, the federal courts still 
have higher levels of public support than do the other branches of 
government.  In fact, in a 2017 public opinion survey about trust in 
government, individuals expressed higher levels of trust for the courts than 
those who trusted either of the other two branches combined.281  As Neal 
Devins and Lawrence Baum have concluded, “[p]olitical polarization, in 
other words, has fueled a general decline in support for all governmental 
actors; it has not eroded the Court’s advantage over the other branches in 
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public approval.”282 
One question is whether federal judges, including U.S. Supreme Court 
justices, alter their decisions in the face of expected congressional 
opposition.  Clark argues that the Supreme Court does not worry very much 
about congressional attacks themselves, but instead the justices see these 
attacks as evidence that their public support (as opposed to their elite 
support) may be weakening.  Clark concludes, “the bulk of empirical 
evidence suggests that the Supreme Court is not at all influenced by 
congressional ideology . . . .  [However], the justices interpret Court-curbing 
threats as signals about the nature of its public support.”283  Thus, court-
curbing legislation serves as an important mechanism for judges to learn 
about their relationship with the general public.284  Devins and Baum 
disagree with this notion that the Supreme Court follows public opinion, 
instead arguing that, “[t]he Justices are more responsive to relevant segments 
of the social and political elite than to the public as a whole.”285 
V. THE COMMITTEES OF LAWYERS 
The Judiciary Committees have traditionally been the committees of 
lawyers.  In their longitudinal study of the committee assignment process in 
the U.S. House from WWII to the early 2000’s, Frisch and Kelly found that, 
“[l]awyers, regardless of party or electoral status, are likely to request 
assignment to Judiciary.”286  The parties generally obliged to these requests, 
and only lawyers were appointed to the committees for many years.287  In 
1989-1990, thirty-four of the thirty-five members of the House Judiciary 
Committee were lawyers.288  The trend continued in 1995, when 
Congressman Sonny Bono (R-CA) was the only non-lawyer to serve on the 
House Judiciary Committee that year.289  Following his death,  his wife Mary 
Bono (R-CA), was the sole non-lawyer on the committee.290  As a result, 
both committees developed a lawyerlike and incrementalistic deliberative 
style and culture. 
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Clearly, lawyer-politicians today continue to be greatly over-
represented among the membership of both Judiciary Committees.291  At the 
end of the 115th Congress (2017-2018), there were 167 voting members with 
law degrees in the full House (37.8%) and fifty-five (55) Senators.292  But, 
in July of 2017, the House Judiciary Committee had only eight non-lawyers 
among the forty members (eighty percent lawyers), and the Senate Judiciary 
Committee had only six non-lawyers among its twenty members (seventy 
percent lawyers).293  In July of 2018, the number of non-lawyers on the 
House Judiciary Committee was nine (seventy-eight percent lawyers), but 
the Senate Judiciary Committee had only four non-lawyers among its 
twenty-one members (eighty-one percent lawyers).294  In June of 2019, the 
Congressional Research Service reported that 161 House members in the full 
House were lawyers (36.6% lawyers) and fifty-three Senators had law 
degrees (fifty-three percent lawyers).295  In July of 2019, on the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, seventy-seven percent of the members were lawyers, 
while lawyers made up eighty percent of the membership of the House 
Judiciary Committee.296  On both committees, the non-lawyers were often 
female.297  For example, in 2019, on the Senate Judiciary Committee, three 
of the five non-lawyers were women (with one male non-lawyer holding a 
Ph.D. instead of a law degree).298 
Many of my interviewees have highlighted the fact that the two 
Judiciary Committees attract especially high-quality lawyer-legislators.  As 
one U.S. Representative told me in 1989, “[i]t’s great to work with all those 
lawyers on [House] Judiciary.  The members have more experience and are 
higher quality than most.  They are also brighter than most.”299  
Congressional staffers on the House Judiciary Committee are almost always 
lawyers themselves have told me over the years that they preferred working 
 
 291   When counting lawyer members in Congress, I count all individuals with law degrees, 
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main occupation.  I argue that even lawyer-politicians who have never practiced law 
nevertheless have been socialized into the profession through law school and thus “think like 
a lawyer.”  See MILLER, HIGH PRIESTS, supra note 2, at 17–23. 
 292   Jennifer E. Manning, MEMBERSHIP OF THE 115TH CONGRESS: A PROFILE 4 
(Congressional Res. Serv., (2018)). 
 293   See the House Judiciary Committee website at https://judiciary.house.gov/. 
 294   See the Senate Judiciary Committee website at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/. 
 295   Jennifer E. Manning, MEMBERSHIP OF THE 115TH CONGRESS: A PROFILE 5 
(Congressional Res. Serv., (2018)). 
 296   See the Senate Judiciary Committee website at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/. 
 297   See the Senate Judiciary Committee website at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/ and 
the House Judiciary Committee website at https://judiciary.house.gov/. 
 298   See the Senate Judiciary Committee website at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/. 
 299   MILLER, HIGH PRIESTS, supra note 2, at 128. 
MILLER (DO NOT DELETE) 4/1/2020  10:53 PM 
2020] JUDICIARY COMMITTEES AND FEDERAL COURTS 241 
with lawyer members of the committee.300  As one staffer explained in an 
interview in 1989, “Because of their training and discipline, lawyer members 
see the importance of nuance and wording.  They also ask tougher questions 
of witnesses.”301  In 2006, stressing the importance of having liberal lawyer-
legislators on the Judiciary Committee, one U.S. Representative told me that, 
“[t]he conservatives don’t understand the courts and the legal ideology of the 
courts very well.  They don’t really know the impact of the opinions of the 
courts, and they don’t bother to try to understand judicial rulings.  They just 
attack the courts.  Lawyers [on the committee] must stand up for the courts 
when they can’t stand up for themselves.”302 
Even the non-lawyer members of the two Judiciary Committees 
eventually learn to navigate the committees’ lawyerlike and incrementalistic 
cultures.  In 2018, a Republican lawyer who worked as a staffer for a GOP 
member of the House Judiciary Committee told me, “[t]here aren’t a lot of 
differences between the lawyer and non-lawyer members.  The lawyers and 
non-lawyers on the committee use the same language.  The non-lawyers 
learn to talk like lawyers.  Newer non-lawyers on the committee who haven’t 
yet adapted are more obvious.”303  Another lobbyist told me, “Senator 
Feinstein, the ranking minority member of the Judiciary Committee, is one 
of the best lawyers on the committee.”304  The statement was, of course, 
meant to be ironic because Senator Feinstein is one of the few members of 
the Senate Committee who does not have a law degree, and the lobbyist was 
fully aware of that fact. 
On the other hand, sometimes the differences between the lawyer-
politicians and the non-lawyers on the committees are more obvious.  In 
2017, a former Democratic staffer on the Senate Judiciary Committee noted 
in an interview with me that, “[i]t is quite obvious that Chairman Grassley 
and Ranking Member Feinstein are not lawyers.  It is quite odd to have non-
lawyers as both the chair and the ranking member.”305  This staffer went on 
to note that it was easy to tell which members of the Senate Committee were 
lawyers because they often highlighted that fact in their public comments.306  
In 2017, a different Democratic Senate staffer told me that his boss “loves 
being a lawyer,” mentions that fact quite often, and has even continued 
writing law review articles after his election to the Senate.307  Not everyone 
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wants the committees to be made up exclusively of lawyers.  For example, 
in 2017, a former Democratic Senate staffer told me that, “[s]ometimes it is 
quite useful to have a non-lawyer perspective on the Committee.”308 
In my early research, lawyer members of the House and especially 
those lawyers who served on the House Judiciary Committee were extremely 
protective of the courts.309  In 1989, one House Judiciary Committee staffer 
explained why he felt the committee was extremely supportive of the third 
branch.  He said, “[j]ust like one can disagree with different schools of 
thought among legal scholars or other academics, Judiciary members 
disagree with the courts without attacking the courts as an institution.  When 
Judiciary members disagree with a court’s decision, they don’t call for the 
impeachment of the judge; they file amicus briefs for the appeal.”310  Things 
had changed quite a bit when I conduced my next round of interviews in 
2006-2007.  Under Chairman Jim Sensenbrenner (R-WI), the conservative 
lawyers on the House Judiciary Committee led the charge against the federal 
courts.  For example, writing in 2006, Bell and Kevin Scott found that House 
Judiciary Committee members were just as likely to introduce court-
stripping legislation as were their colleagues who did not serve on that 
committee.311  These scholars also found that lawyers in the House were just 
as likely to introduce court-curbing legislation as were their non-lawyer 
colleagues.312  As an employee of the judicial branch told me in 2006, “[t]he 
days when we could count on lawyers in the House to protect judicial 
independence are long over.  Today ideology and party matter much more 
than whether a member has a law degree.”313 
Not everyone was happy that there were so many non-lawyers serving 
in key roles on the Senate Judiciary Committee.  In 2018, one lobbyist was 
quite critical of Senator Chuck Grassley (R-IA), the former chair of the 
Committee.  This lobbyist stated, “[a]s a non-lawyer, Grassley is unaware of 
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the process used in the Judicial Conference to make policy.”314  In an 
interview with me in 2018, an employee of a think tank was equally critical 
of Senator Grassley’s approach to the judiciary, noting that, “Grassley only 
has a vague conception of what courts do.  Everything with Grassley is 
personal, and he has a great deal of antagonism toward federal judges.”315  
This person continued, “[a]s a non-lawyer, Grassley doesn’t understand how 
the court system actually functions.”316  In 2017, a Democratic Senate staffer 
was more subtle in his criticism of the chairman when he told me, “Grassley 
is a non-lawyer, and certain issues matter more to him and matter differently 
than to the lawyer members on the committee.”317  Another Democratic 
staffer told me that, “[t]he non-lawyer members of the committee rely more 
on the lawyers on their staff than the lawyer members do.”318 
Both Senator Grassley and former House Judiciary Chair Jim 
Sensenbrenner (R-WI) are often critical of the federal courts.  For instance, 
both Senator Grassley and Jim Sensenbrenner (R-WI) have introduced anti-
court legislation to create an Inspector General for the federal judiciary who 
would report back directly to Congress.319  In the press release that notes the 
introduction of the bill, the Senator stated, “[i]t’s been shown through press 
accounts and various reports that the federal judiciary is in need of some 
sunshine.  An Inspector General can only help shed more light on the actions 
of the Judicial Branch and keep it accountable to the American people.”320  
In 2006, although the legislation passed the House Judiciary Committee, the 
Senate Committee has never considered it.321  However, in June 2018, during 
a hearing on sexual harassment in the judiciary, Senator Grassley again 
called for the creation of an Inspector General for the federal courts.322  
Grassley, however, unlike Chairman Sensenbrenner of the House Judiciary 
Committee, did not bring the legislation to a mark-up in the committee, even 
though he could have because of his position as committee chair.  Speaking 
to me in 2017, another lobbyist explained that, “Grassley wants comity and 
collegiality, and thus he won’t push anti-court legislation in the 
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committee.”323 
VI. THE ROLE OF THE COMMITTEE CHAIR 
The leader of a congressional committee at any specific time can have 
a huge effect on the approach and agenda of that committee and its 
relationship with the federal courts.  In his study of various committee chairs, 
Andrees Reeves argued that the “[individual] chairmen made a difference in 
the structure, operations, output, and function of the committee, each leading 
in a different way.  While institutional environmental influences leadership, 
the way the chairman uses the resources at hand—both institutional 
prerogatives and personal resources—also has an impact on the institution 
and its outputs.  In large part as a result of the differences in leadership, the 
committee was a different organization under each chairman.”324  In other 
words, who the committee chair is at any given time matters. 
Committee chairs can have a great deal of influence over staffing issues 
for the committees within the broader institutional constraints often imposed 
by party leadership in the parent chamber.325  Some chairs will hire as many 
staffers as possible to work for the chair of the full committee, while others 
will allow the subcommittee chairs to hire more staff.326  Committee chairs 
can also determine what kind of staff are hired by the committee, which can 
involve hiring more with a policy focus or more with a communications or 
public relations focus.  For example, Casey Burgat and Charles Hunt have 
found in their study of committee staffs between 2001 and 2017, that over 
this period, the House Judiciary Committee lost about a third of its policy-
focused staff and gained more communications aides.327  These scholars note 
that for the House Judiciary Committee, “[t]here used to be about 25 policy-
focused staffers for every communication aide.  Now the ratio is closer to 5 
to 1.”328  Different committee chairs make different choices about how many 
and what kind of staff the committee will employ. 
One key difference between the House and Senate Judiciary 
Committees is the fact that the Senate Committee has always had a much 
larger number of employees than its House counterpart. This may be due to 
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the Senate Committee’s role in judicial nominations and confirmations.  
Burgat and Hunt found that in 2001, the Senate Judiciary Committee had 157 
staffers while the House Judiciary Committee employed only eighty-nine 
staffers.329  In 2017, however, the Senate Committee employed 103 people 
while the House Committee employed only seventy-seven.330  The ratio 
among senior staffers, policy-oriented staffers, and communications staffers 
seems to change depending on who is chairing each committee respectively.  
The trend, however, is that the total number of staff for the Senate Committee 
has been steadily declining in the 2001-2017 period, while the number of 
House Committee staffers has fluctuated somewhat but remained generally 
stable.331  Burgat and Hunt report that overall Senate committee staffs 
dropped throughout the chamber by fifteen percent during the 2001-2017 
period.332  The Senate Committee certainly has a smaller percentage of 
communications staff when compared to its House counterpart.333 
The individual chairing a congressional committee can also affect the 
legislative effectiveness of that committee, as well as relationships with other 
committees.  John Baughman, in his study of cooperation and competition 
among congressional committees, notes that the personalities of committee 
leaders can contribute to the level of cooperation or confrontation among 
committees.334  Citing Hall’s work,335 Baughman also argued that the House 
member participation in committee work is uneven, allowing committee 
chairs and a few highly interested committee members to dominate a 
committee’s agenda.336  In their study of legislative effectiveness in 
Congress, Craig Volden and Alan Wiseman found that committee and 
subcommittee chairs had the highest legislative effectiveness scores.337  As 
these scholars note, “[c]ommittee and subcommittee chairs significantly 
outperformed minority-party members and members of their own party.”338  
In his work on Senate committees, C. Lawrence Evans agrees, concluding 
that, “Committee leaders tend to be more effective at managing information 
the longer they have held the position, the broader their experience as a 
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committee leader, and the longer they have been in the Senate.”339 
The committee chair on the Judiciary Committees holds a great deal of 
power in the committee, especially in the House.  Over the years, the prestige 
and attractiveness of the House Judiciary Committee was largely driven by 
the agenda of its chair.340  For example, Emanuel Celler (D-NY) maintained 
control over the House Judiciary Committee by assigning the committee’s 
subcommittees very vague jurisdictions so that he could directly control 
which subcommittee received a specific bill.341  Chairman Jack Brooks (D-
TX), who served as committee chair in the early 1990s, has been described 
as “aggressive,” although less autocratic than some of his predecessors.342  
Chairman Jim Sensenbrenner (R-WI) was a hands-on chair who greatly 
influenced the direction that the committee took, and especially in his disdain 
for the federal judiciary.  Sensenbrenner has been described as “opinionated 
and direct to a fault,”343 “heavy-handed,” “gratuitously partisan,”344 and that 
he “doesn’t suffer fools lightly.  Known as much for his prickliness as his 
smarts, he can be downright ornery to colleagues, journalists, unprepared 
witnesses, and even constituents.”345  As a Senate Judiciary Committee 
staffer told me in 2006, “Sensenbrenner is a partisan guy who wants to assert 
his power and always get his way.”346 
Decentralization and the respect for the rights of individual Senators 
have in part made the Senate Judiciary Committee chair less powerful than 
his House colleagues.  Traditionally, the Senate Judiciary Committee has 
been highly decentralized,347 as evidenced by the size of the committee staff, 
for example.  In 1965, when the average size of a committee staff was 
twenty-eight, the Senate Judiciary Committee had 137 staffers, almost all 
employed by the committee’s subcommittees and hired by their respective 
chairs.348  Senator James Eastland (D-MS) allowed the subcommittees to 
have a great deal of discretion in their work during his term as chair in the 
1960s and 1970s.349  The decentralized nature of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee continued into the 1980’s and has led scholars to refer to 
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Republican Chairman Strom Thurmond as more constrained in his 
leadership tactics than other Senate committee chairs at the time.350  Perhaps 
Thurmond had no choice, but Evans describes the policy consequences of 
his procedural choices as “negligible.”351  Thus, Thurmond was described as 
being “fair, but his fairness had boundaries.”352  Given the institutional 
constraints, some have even argued that the Senate Judiciary Committee 
would not have tolerated a powerful committee chair in that era.353 
More recent chairs of the Senate Judiciary Committee have asserted 
their individual powers more forcefully.  As former chair Senator Patrick 
Leahy (D-VT) once told a journalist, “I’ve always set the agenda in 
Judiciary.”354  Recently, however, Chairman Chuck Grassley (R-IA) has 
yielded to pressure from the Majority Leader to change his blue-slip policy 
and to refuse to allow hearings on President Obama’s nomination of Merrick 
Garland to the U.S. Supreme Court.355  Thus, the Senate Judiciary Committee 
reflects the realities of its parent chamber.  However, the committee chair 
can significantly influence the committee functions.  For example, we have 
seen many differences in how various Senate Judiciary chairs handled the 
blue-slip process, as discussed in more detail above.356 
It is certainly true that who is chairing the Judiciary Committees can 
have an enormous effect on the relationship between the committee and the 
federal courts.  For example, House Judiciary Chair Emanuel Celler (D-NY) 
was generally a friend of the federal courts, and he used his power as 
committee chair to block jurisdiction stripping proposals and other anti-court 
measures in the 1960’s and early 1970’s.357  Chairman Peter Rodino (D-NJ) 
further protected the courts by making the committee a graveyard for 
conservative anti-court measures, including various proposed constitutional 
amendments in the 1970’s and 1980’s.358  Chairman Jack Brooks (D-TX) 
generally followed the Rodino model.  After the Republicans took control of 
the full House (which was after the 1994 elections), Chairman Henry Hyde 
(R-IL) was strongly supportive of the courts and did not allow the committee 
to consider court-curbing measures.359  On the other hand, Hyde’s successor 
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Chairman Jim Sensenbrenner (R-WI) was extremely antagonistic toward the 
federal judiciary, as one staffer for a judicial branch agency that closely 
follows court-Congress relations told me in 2018.360  As a Democratic 
member of the House Judiciary Committee told me in 2006, “Chairman 
Sensenbrenner wants to whip up the country against the courts, turning the 
judges into the enemy.  Federal judges feel physically insecure right now.”361  
Sensenbrenner thereby led the charge against the federal judiciary and 
convinced his committee to pass legislation that would have created an 
Inspector General for the Federal Judiciary. 
Subsequent chairs have been far less antagonistic towards the courts.  
As one lobbyist mentioned in 2018, Chairman Lamar Smith (R-TX) was less 
problematic for the courts than Sensenbrenner, while Chairman Bob 
Goodlatte (R-VA) was quite sympathetic to the courts, and to federal judges 
in particular.362  This individual concluded that, “Chairman Lamar Smith was 
fine to work with on various issues affecting the federal courts.”363  Chairman 
Jerrold Nadler (D-NY) has been a strong champion of the federal judiciary 
and has led the charge against anti-court measures over the years.364  As one 
lobbyist told me in 2018, “[t]he key factor of great importance in the 
relationship between Congress and the courts is the committee leadership 
and their individual attitudes towards the judiciary.”365 
In order to understand the effects that an individual can have on the 
committee, it is useful to compare two chairs of the House Judiciary 
Committee who took very different approaches to leading the committee.  
Comparing the leadership of Chairman Hyde and Sensenbrenner, both 
conservative Midwestern Republicans, one congressional staffer explained 
to me in 2006, “Congressman Hyde had an old-school approach to the courts, 
treating judges with the respect deserved for members of a co-equal 
institution.  Sensenbrenner is a highly partisan guy who wants to assert his 
own power and impose his will on anyone who gets in his way, including 
federal judges.”366  When Representative Hyde stepped down as chair of the 
House Judiciary Committee in 2001, the U.S. Judicial Conference passed a 
resolution praising his assistance to the federal courts.367  On the other hand, 
Chairman Sensenbrenner led institutional attacks against the courts,368 and 
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convinced the House Committee to pass anti-court legislation, including a 
bill that would have created an Inspector General for the federal judiciary.369  
As chairman of the committee, he also led the committee in impeachment 
investigations against several sitting federal judges, although these 
committees did not come forward with the articles of impeachment in these 
cases.370  Clearly, the individual who chairs the Judiciary Committees has a 
strong effect on the relationship between the committees and the federal 
judiciary. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
The relationship between Congress and the federal courts is clearly 
complicated, and the interactions at any given moment in time are heavily 
influenced by a variety of factors.  The relationships between the courts and 
the House Judiciary Committee and the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
respectively, are equally complex.  Both committees are dominated by 
lawyer-legislators who serve on the committees in much greater numbers 
than their proportion in the parent chambers.371  As the “Committees of 
Lawyers,” both Judiciary Committees tend to have court-like and lawyerly 
cultures that tend to prefer incrementalistic approaches to decision-making.  
Traditionally, lawyers would protect the courts from attacks, although this 
seemed to change in the early 2000’s, at least on the House Judiciary 
Committee.372  The court-like decisional style, however, seems to be more 
deeply engrained on the Senate Judiciary Committee.  In overall terms, the 
relationship between the committees and the courts has been cooperative at 
times, but at other times it has been highly conflictual. 
It is quite common for politicians to criticize specific court rulings with 
which they disagree.  It is very rare, however, for Congress to take action to 
restrict the institutional power of the independent judiciary, and thus reduce 
the voice of the courts in the inter-institutional dialogue that helps determine 
constitutional meaning in our society.373  When Congress is angry with the 
federal courts, it has a wide array of weapons in its arsenal to use against the 
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judiciary.  Although Congress often makes threats against the courts, such 
measures are rarely used.  Not only are the two Judiciary Committees the 
chief voices of their respective chambers on constitutional issues, but they 
are also the place where court-curbing legislation often begins.  This is 
especially true in the House, where the committee chair has stronger control 
over the committee’s agenda than in the Senate. 
The House and Senate Judiciary Committees are constrained by 
broader institutional structures, norms, and cultures of their parent chambers.  
The Senate has a long tradition of protecting the prerogatives and rights of 
individual Senators, and the Senate committee system makes committees 
much weaker than those in the House.374  Senate committees tend to be 
decentralized, which gives the chair of the committee less power than his or 
her House counterparts.  The Senate is also likely to ignore most extreme 
bills, that may pass the House, because of the procedural rules in the Senate, 
including the filibuster on the Senate floor.375  Thus, Senate committees often 
become graveyards for bills approved by the more aggressive House.  
Whoever chairs the Senate Judiciary Committee must function in this 
environment.  The Senate Judiciary Committee often refuses to consider 
anti-court legislation occasionally passed in the House. 
The House, on the other hand, is a very hierarchical institution that 
protects the needs of the majority party.  Even though this power has shifted 
back and forth over time between committee chairs and party leaders in the 
chamber, the House Committee chairs have nevertheless retained a fair 
amount of discretion to determine the committee’s approach to various 
issues.  This power is enhanced by the fact that on the House Judiciary 
Committee, members tend to come from the extremes of each party, thus 
giving the House Committee chair the advantage of having like-minded 
colleagues in his or her party on the committee.  The House Judiciary 
Committee’s relationship with the federal courts is largely determined by the 
preferences of whomever is chairing the committee.  When the chair has an 
anti-court agenda, then he or she is likely able to convince the members of 
his or her party on the committee to follow their lead.376 
Today, interest groups representing the Religious Right and the Tea 
Party Movement play a large role in lobbying the two Judiciary Committees 
about their desires to reign in the federal courts.377  In the late 1800’s and 
early 1900’s, it was Progressives and Populists from the left who wanted to 
limit the power of the then-conservative activist federal bench.378  Since the 
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1950’s, however, conservative interest groups, especially those affiliated 
with the Religious Right and other social conservative movements, wanted 
to place restrictions on the policy-making abilities of the federal courts.379  
These individuals want to reduce the voice of the federal courts by calling 
for impeachment of judges who issue rulings with which they disagree or for 
other structural changes that would restrict the independence of the federal 
judiciary.380  In the early 2000’s, these groups were especially successful in 
getting the attention of the members of the House Judiciary Committee and 
its then chairman, Representative James Sensenbrenner (R-WI).  These 
socially conservative interest groups wanted to reduce what they perceived 
to be the liberal activist voice of the federal courts in the inter-institutional 
constitutional dialogue.  The House Committee discussed a variety of anti-
court measures, held a variety of hearings on anti-court legislation, set forth 
potential articles of impeachment for several federal judges, and passed 
several court-curbing bills in committee mark-ups.381  The conservative 
lawyer members of the House Judiciary Committee accommodated the 
desires of these groups, leading to what many labeled “The War on 
Judges.”382 
One key difference between the House and Senate Judiciary 
Committees that does not seem to affect the relationship between the 
committees and the federal courts is the role that the Senate committee plays 
in the confirmation process for federal judicial nominees.  Although the 
House has no role in confirming federal judges, this difference does not seem 
to make the Senate more protective of federal judges.  Judges seem to leave 
lobbying efforts for both committees to the professional lobbyists in the 
Administrative Office of the Federal Courts, who speak on behalf of the 
Judiciary Conference (the policy arm of the federal judiciary).383  Because 
judges rarely contact either Members of Congress or Senators directly, the 
role of the Senate in confirming federal judges does not seem to change the 
committee’s interactions with the federal courts after the appointment and 
confirmation stage. 
The individual who is chairing the committee is perhaps the key 
variable that shapes the relationship between the judiciary and the two 
committees.  This factor seems to be much more important in the House than 
in the Senate, although it is important to see how various chairs of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee have approached the blue-slip tradition during the 
confirmation process for federal judges.  While the chairs of the Senate 
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Committee seem to be able to shape their committee’s approach to judicial 
confirmations, within the constraints imposed by the party leadership in the 
chamber, they have less power to influence the committee’s overall approach 
to anti-court legislation.384  For example, when Senator Chuck Grassley (R-
IA) chaired the Senate Committee, he could not convince the committee to 
approve his court-curbing agenda, in part because he could not overcome the 
Senate’s general unwillingness to enact extreme and non-incrementalistic 
measures.  Senator Grassley also did not want to increase tensions with the 
other members of the committee on legislative matters because he was 
compelled by the party leadership to take certain highly controversial steps 
on the judicial confirmation side.  One example, in particular, was Senator 
Grassley’s refusal to hold confirmation hearings on President Obama’s 
appointment of Judge Merrick Garland to the U.S. Supreme Court.385  The 
Senate Judiciary Committee is thus clearly reflective of the broader culture 
of its parent chamber, which means it is harder for the Senate chair to control 
the approach of the committee, unlike the House chair. 
In the House, the key variable in court-Congress relations seems to be 
the agenda of the chair of the House Judiciary Committee.  In general, 
committee chairs in the House have a great deal of discretion when it comes 
to setting the tone, approach, and agenda of their committee.  When chairs 
of the House Judiciary Committee like Representatives Rodino (D-NJ), 
Hyde (R-IL), or Nadler (D-NY), wanted to protect the courts from attacks, 
they were able to do so.  On the other hand, when chairs like Representative 
Sensenbrenner (R-WI) wanted to restrict the independence of the courts, he 
was able to convince the committee members to follow his lead in part 
because the committee has traditionally drawn its members from the most 
extreme wings of both parties.  Sensenbrenner was able to shape the work of 
the committee to promote his personal anti-court agenda which also reflected 
the agenda of the key Religious Right, Tea Party, and other socially 
conservative interest groups.  This was in part due to the fact that Republican 
members of the committee all supported those same groups.386  It is worth 
noting, however, that few of these measures were considered on the floor of 
the House.  Although the relationship between the Judiciary Committees and 
the federal courts are extremely complicated, there are many variables to 
consider.  Ultimately, a key factor to consider is the committee chair, who 
can have a profound effect on the role that each branch plays in the inter-
institutional constitutional dialogue. 
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